SBU Major General: Russian Generals Realize That The Situation Is Critical

• 22.01.2026, 22:24

Everyone is enrolled, everyone is remembered and no one will be forgotten.

A car carrying Russian general Ruslan Yevdokimov, commander of the 98th Airborne Division, was detonated in the occupied territory of Kherson Oblast.

Can we speak of a targeted special operation by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, rather than an accidental bombing?

About this site Charter97.org talked to retired SBU Major General Viktor Yagun:

- This happened for a reason, and many versions can be put forward, up to the fact that their own could have blown up because someone wanted to take a position. In fact, participating in the war in Ukraine is a completely different specificity. You are on occupied territory, and on the territory where the population does not perceive you as a friendly army of "brothers".

And even after a generation (the experience of Western Ukraine shows this) this hatred will still come out. And if the occupiers think that a simple replacement of the population can change something, they are deeply mistaken. They will not be able to replace the population - there is no one to replace it with. Who? Immigrants? Taking people from the north and transporting them to the occupied territory?

This is for many years - until they leave. So it's very hard to say who is behind it. It could be the locals, it could be a special operation of the SDF, which have appropriate units and maintain contact with local movements - guerrilla, rebel movements. It can also be a special operation and the work of Ukraine's special services, which formally do not belong to the Special Operations Forces, but also work in the occupied territory.

- As a result of sabotage by the Ukrainian armed forces, Russian generals have been eliminated not only at the front, but also in the rear. How many confirmed cases can we talk about and how does this affect the combat effectiveness of the Russian army?

- I can't say that this has directly undermined combat effectiveness, because, after all, the army is a huge mechanism, and there is someone to replace it. But there are some things that are irreplaceable. For example, the liquidation of generals in Moscow. These people held relevant positions that were key to one process or another. They had been in these positions for more than a year, they understood the situation well, and it was very hard to simply uproot and replace them.

I think that these are very serious psychological blows to the generals, who realize that the situation is critical and that everyone can be found. Even after the Chechen war there were isolated cases when some colonels were stabbed to death or someone was hit on the head with a brick, and even that was psychologically very hard for the people who participated in that war. And here they faced serious opposition from the state machine, which works very clearly: everyone is recorded, everyone is remembered and no one will be forgotten.

- In what condition is the officer corps of Russia now? Is there a possible management crisis due to a shortage of experienced commanders?

- This is a very big problem, because it is impossible to repeat what happened in World War II, when you could take a "Shot" course, ten months - and a pilot is ready. Now you can't do that, because the aircraft are completely different. The situation is the same with other units - with unmanned systems, with air defense. All these systems are very complex, computerized, and you need to understand the specifics of certain actions.

The Russian army has a huge problem with low-level officers - those who are directly involved in attacks: platoon and company commanders, up to battalion level. This is a very serious problem. The situation is even more acute with non-commissioned officers, with warrant officers. Yes, it is possible to choose someone from the mass of soldiers and put him in a position, but this is the layer of people who have to do a huge amount of work for the unit to function. These are deputy platoon commanders, company petty officers - and the situation here is also extremely difficult.

And how to make up for it? I don't know. I think they call up someone somewhere in the reserves. But, you know, a man who has never served in his life, and who at 50 is told that he must now command a company of soldiers - it's just fantastic for him. All the more so to remember some things related to the chain of command. So the problem is huge. How do they solve it? They don't. They will simply scale the problem, and the crisis will really begin.

And the fact that after the war ends (and everyone understands that it will end: not today, so tomorrow, not tomorrow, so the day after tomorrow), the Russian army will still have the problem of restoring personnel potential and creating any reserves for decades to come, there is no doubt about that.