"This Is A Historic Move By Germany."

• 22.12.2025, 11:35

The head of the Naumann Foundation's office spoke about whether Berlin is ready to take responsibility in the region.

How has Germany's aid to Ukraine changed? Is Berlin ready to become a leading force in Europe? Can free Belarus count on Germany's help?

Anna Kravchenko, head of the representative office of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in Ukraine and Belarus, told Anna Kravchenko in an interview with Charter97.org.

- Germany has become one of the main moving forces in support of Ukraine. How did Berlin's position change over the years of the war? How did it transform?"

- Germany's position underwent a fundamental transformation. At the outbreak of full-scale war, under the influence of historical constraints, energy dependence on Russia, and a focus on a diplomatic settlement, Berlin acted cautiously, despite the "change of eras" (Zeitenwende) proclaimed by then Chancellor Olaf Scholz. A sad symbol of this approach was the delivery of 5,000 helmets to Ukraine as initial military aid, which tarnished Germany's reputation internationally, and in Ukraine especially. Over time, however, Germany shifted from the logic of "containment of escalation" to the logic of strategic responsibility.

This was particularly clear at the December 14-15 meeting on Ukraine in Berlin. Germany acted not just as a participant and host, but as one of the political and organizational centers of European support for Ukraine. The main outcomes of the meeting, especially the proposal to send a European peacekeeping contingent to Ukraine, demonstrate that support for Ukraine is not a temporary measure, but an element of European security. Given Germany's historically entrenched pacifism, the proposal to send a contingent to Ukraine is a rather serious step on Chancellor Merz's part.

In the past four years, Germany has evolved from a "hesitant partner" to a country that realizes that without its active role, European policy towards Ukraine simply does not work. At the moment, Berlin is Kiev's strongest ally and the main source of military and financial aid for Ukraine.

- The US is increasingly reducing its presence on the European continent, retreating into isolationism. Europe will have to be more active. Is Germany, the leading EU country, ready for a more decisive role?

- Politically - I think yes, institutionally and in terms of public acceptance of this role - not yet fully. In Berlin, it is increasingly clear that the old model, in which the U.S. guarantees Europe's security, is no longer reliable. This realization has become particularly acute against the backdrop of the uncertainty of American domestic politics. The J.D. Vance speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2025 threw Germany, and indeed Europe, into a stupor. The Trump administration's subsequent moves have rather shaken up European leaders.

The realization has come that relying on US support in the event of further military escalation on the European continent is a risky business, and it is time to take charge.

The Berlin meeting on Ukraine showed: Germany is ready to assume a coordinating role, but tries to do it in a multilateral format - through the EU, NATO and a "coalition of the willing." Germany avoids the image of a sole leader, preferring to act as a moderator of the European consensus. Speaking of consensus, there is no such consensus in Europe either. The EU summit on December 18, at which EU leaders could barely agree on further financing of Ukraine through the use of frozen Russian assets, showed us what it is all about.

- This year Germany deployed a permanent Bundeswehr brigade in Lithuania. Major reforms have begun in the German army, and the military concern Rheinmetall has become a major player in the arms market. Is Germany becoming Europe's leading military power?

- Germany is moving in that direction, but has not yet become Europe's leading military power in the full sense of the word. The deployment of a permanent brigade to Lithuania is a historic step: for the first time since the Cold War, Germany is deploying a major permanent force on NATO's eastern flank. It is not a symbol but a strategic commitment.

Bundeswehr reforms, a rising defense budget and a strengthening defense industry, including billions of dollars in orders from Rheinmetall, point to a long-term reversal. But Germany still faces challenges: bureaucracy, personnel shortages, and slow procurement procedures.

The beginning has been made, but the process of reforming the Bundeswehr, including the issue of conscription (conscription was suspended in 2011), will take a long time, which Germany may no longer have.

- Donald Trump's administration has gone for a dialog with the regime of Alexander Lukashenko. In return for the release of political prisoners, Washington is gradually lifting sanctions. Will Berlin's position towards the Belarusian regime change?

- Germany's position is unlikely to change fundamentally. Berlin traditionally adheres to a more value-based and institutional approach than Washington. Even if the US makes tactical deals, Germany will be guided by the position of the EU as a whole.

For Berlin, three criteria remain key: an end to repression, the real release of all political prisoners, and an end to Belarus's complicity in Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Most likely, Germany will support limited humanitarian contacts without recognizing the political legitimacy of the regime.

- How do you see Germany's role in supporting democratic change in Belarus when the opportunity arises?

- Germany can play a key role as a guarantor of the sustainability of the democratic transition. This includes support for independent media and civil society, expert assistance in reforms, the restoration of local self-governance, and the integration of a democratic Belarus into European structures.

Germany's experience with Central and Eastern Europe, as well as with Ukraine, makes it a particularly valuable partner. It is important that Berlin does not think in the logic of a quick change of power, but in the logic of long-term institution-building.

When the window of opportunity opens, Germany is likely to become one of the main advocates of democratic Belarus in the EU - just as it is one of the key advocates of Ukraine today.