"For Ukraine, It's A Red Line In The Negotiations"

• 2.12.2025, 16:33

Ukrainian political analyst tells why the "peace plan" has reached a dead end.

The media reports that during the talks in Florida, the Ukrainian delegation rejected the US on two issues - withdrawal of troops from Donbass and NATO.

Are these red lines for Kiev? The website Charter97.org talked to Vladimir Fesenko, a well-known Ukrainian political scientist and head of the Penta Center for Applied Political Research, about this:

- The territorial issue is a red line. Non-recognition by Russia of those territories that the Russian Federation occupied, annexed. Naturally, the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the territory of Donbas is also unacceptable to us. This is not supported by both society and the state leadership.

It is not only that we are giving up our territory for nothing, but we also understand perfectly well that this will mean the issuance of new Russian ultimatums. Now Donbass, and tomorrow we will be reminded that Russia "did not give up" Kherson and Zaporozhye, will demand Kherson and Zaporozhye, and after that Kharkiv and Odessa. We understand this perfectly well, unlike the Americans.

Americans are somehow too trusting of Putin's readiness and his promises. He doesn't say "stop the war," he says "stop." This is a promise of a cease-fire, a cease-fire if Ukrainian troops withdraw from Donbass.

The second red line is a principled one. We are against limiting our internal and external sovereignty, against fulfilling Russia's demands that we should write into the Constitution of Ukraine the rejection of the prospect of joining NATO. Our position is that this decision does not depend on us, it depends on NATO's readiness.

If NATO is ready to make a decision that Ukraine will not be part of the North Atlantic Alliance, well, this is NATO's right. Then we will make such a decision, what to do. But Ukraine will not, at Russia's request, limit its internal sovereignty. In this case we are talking about NATO, but it also concerns European integration, and domestic political issues, the status of the Russian language, the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, and so on. These are the red lines.

Americans, by the way, have adopted this Ukrainian position before. In this plan, out of 28 points, Russia has made a demand that we must agree to write in our Constitution that we renounce NATO. Previously, the Americans did not demand this from us.

The second disagreement concerns a more complex issue. It is security guarantees for Ukraine.

- What is meant?

- The issue is not that the Americans refuse security guarantees. They used to say that "no, we will not give any security guarantees, let the Europeans give them to you". Already in August and in the fall, the U.S. position has changed. They understand that it is really necessary to provide us with security guarantees.

They are negotiating on their specification, what exactly it should mean, in what form it should happen. Here the US position has changed for the better for us. But purely tactically, the Americans insist that we must first agree to peace agreements, and then the issue of security guarantees will be decided. This logic is unacceptable for us. We have already learned by bitter experience. For example, with the Budapest Memorandum.

And then there was the story in the late 90s with the "Bushehr contract". This refers to the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran, where Ukraine had large contracts, but under pressure from the U.S. we refused and received practically nothing for it. And we had to bargain and get compensation. There were several other similar situations. That is why it is very important for us that the issue of security guarantees be resolved simultaneously with the preparation and signing of the peace agreement, and not afterwards. Or they may say: yes, we promised, but it is not working. No, it should be simultaneous. This is not such a fundamental issue either. There is no contradiction with Russia, as on the territorial issue. The territorial issue is a stalemate. I can't even theoretically see a compromise. On the issue of security guarantees, I think a compromise is still possible. It will be found after some time. So far there is such, I would say, tactical struggle.

And one more point I would like to mention. Ukraine will be against unilateral concessions. For example, if we are talking about the reduction of troops, the question should be raised about mutual reduction after the end of hostilities. Parity reduction. If, say, Ukrainian troops are reduced to 600,000, then Russian troops in the conflict zone and in the border regions with Ukraine, including Belarus, should also not exceed 600,000 people.

- Today, Trump's special envoy Whitkoff is flying to Russia. U.S. analysts at the Institute for the Study of War write that Russia will reject the peace proposal the U.S. and Ukraine have been working on. Is that a possibility?"

- We'll see what Whitkoff comes back from Moscow with. My expectations are, let's say, far from optimistic.

Putin will again put forward desires, ultimatums, demands to Ukraine, which are unacceptable to us. And his aggressiveness and rigidity of these demands has even increased. So the risk of another deadlock in the negotiation process, unfortunately, is increasing.

So unlike the position of the White House, I do not understand why they believe that they are very close to some kind of agreement, I see Putin's position as a regression, a departure from a possible compromise.

- Then what options does Trump have left?

- Putin will convince Whitkoff and Kushner that it is necessary to work out not a U.S.-Ukrainian peace plan, but a U.S.-Russian one. That is, to return, in effect, to this 28-point version. Maybe the number of points will be different, but there should be a U.S.-Russian plan.

And it is highly likely that Putin will propose a face-to-face meeting with Trump to work out such a plan. This is a manifestation of constructiveness, that, say, "I'm ready to negotiate, but it requires a personal meeting." That, I think, will be the main chip in Russia's proposals.

But at the same time, they will say that they don't agree to many of the points in this plan that was agreed to in Geneva and partly in Miami. And Russia will offer Trump pressure on Ukraine. That is, let's agree on a joint U.S.-Russian plan, and you further force Ukraine to implement that plan. That's one option that will basically come from Russia's side. And it will be offered to Trump. The second option, which many experts are talking about, including in the United States, Trump should return to a hard line towards Russia.

He should put pressure on Russia: both sanctions and political pressure. If Putin wants a meeting, as he did at the end of October, there should be a tough stance. They say, I am ready to meet only if you are ready for a ceasefire agreement. And for peace talks on all other issues. But you have to agree on a ceasefire. If you're not ready, there will be no meeting. The resumption of negotiations on the supply of long-range weapons to Ukraine. This has a very strong influence on Russia, as practice has shown.

Together, if there is such pressure on Russia, I think that, maybe not immediately, but after some time Putin may become more constructive. The third option, if the Americans see that the situation is deadlocked, there is no possibility of reaching some kind of compromise in the near future, before the end of the year. If Russia is not ready for real negotiations with Ukraine or for the continuation of shuttle negotiations to find a compromise, then another pause in the negotiation process until next year.