Experts Believe That Lukashenko's Regime Will Not Resist After The Dictator's Departure
- 18.11.2025, 9:40
Change is inevitable.
During the second expert discussion held under the Chatham House rule on October 14, five representatives of the Belarusian and Russian expert communities each considered scenarios after Putin and Lukashenko leave. The details of the discussion were reported by the portal "Our Opinion".
One of the scenarios is chaos and inability of the regime representatives to hold on to power. The discussion showed that certain prerequisites for chaotization exist, especially in Russia. This scenario was named the most likely (40%), but some experts believe that chaos is inevitable at least in the short term, while others believe that in any case the situation will quickly move to a new orderly state.
A number of key factors influence the likelihood of this scenario. First, the timing of regime change in Minsk and Moscow. Most scenarios are based on the premise of simultaneous departure of Lukashenko and Putin, which in reality is far from guaranteed. Moreover, a non-simultaneous transit is much more likely. If Putin leaves earlier, Belarus may get both a chance to strengthen its sovereignty and the threat of more brutal interference by the Kremlin.
Secondly, it is Russia's war against Ukraine. Experts have assumed in their assumptions that the war is still underway by the time of transit. If one imagines a Russian defeat or escalation to new countries, then the equation could change dramatically. But in a protracted war of attrition, Russia will approach the change of power weakened. For it, losing control over Ukraine means losing its last imperial symbol, and a Ukrainian victory becomes the catalyst for a global shift. If Moscow tries to take revenge at any cost, but resources are running out, internal regime collapse is most likely. In general, the worse the war ends for Russia, the higher the probability of a chaotic end to the authoritarian system. The economic collapse in Russia will immediately lead Belarus into the abyss. Under such conditions, social upheavals will sweep through both countries, and the public demand for an alternative will sharply intensify. Suddenly awakened society, demanding changes, may get out of control and become an additional factor of chaotization.
The possibility of degradation and "self-decomposition" of the systems themselves without visible external influence, as it was in the late USSR, is not discarded. In the Russian Federation, according to experts, there is already a crisis of loyalty at the top, when ministers and governors formally support the center, but follow orders more and more inertly and prepare backup plans. And if the ruling vertical begins to rot from within, the outer facade of monolithicism may collapse at any moment. Prigozhin's revolt in 2023, when the army practically did not intervene, showed that even elite military structures can refuse to protect the regime. Similar processes can take place in Belarus, where the elites as such have been destroyed. But if a part of the nomenklatura suddenly agrees among themselves, it will at least cause a split (into nationally-oriented versus pro-Russian), or even lead to a conflict or dual power after Lukashenko.
Neither Lukashenko nor Putin leave behind a clear procedure of power transfer. There are no signs of an organized transit (or at least candidates), especially in Belarus, where Lukashenko "nipped in the bud" any potential for independent organization of the vertical. In Russia, the elites are more clearly formed - siloviki, technocrats, oligarchs - but there is no talk of their consolidation. Added to this is the presence of regional elites and clans with personal "pocket" troops, especially in the Caucasus. Tens of thousands of veterans, who will return from the war embittered and without prospects, may also become a factor of destabilization. All this creates the ground for chaos if the center weakens. Putin's death in such conditions may become a starting shot: the country will burst into internal redistribution and separatist disorder. For Belarus, Putin's departure with Lukashenko alive will also be a severe stress, up to a possible mass return of some emigration.