Lukashenka's Four Mistakes That Led to the Collapse of His Regime

• Ihar Illiash, Belsat
• 29.12.2020, 14:08

Total politicization of the population took place in Belarus.

The main results of 2020 were the birth of the Belarusian political nation and the creation of a situation in which the Belarusian political model's collapse became a matter of the near future. This situation has developed thanks to the four main mistakes of Aliaksandr Lukashenka; each of them widened the gap between society and the authorities and awakened the political consciousness of Belarusians.

Nobody predicted that 2020 in Belarus could become a year of historical events: it was expected that the current elections would be the calmest and least interesting in the country's history. Moreover, they took place in the year of the coronavirus pandemic, which, according to most experts, should have been an additional factor in demobilization. However, contrary to these forecasts, it was the coronavirus that became the first impetus for the awakening of society.

Mistake # 1: dealing with the pandemic

Unlike most European countries, Belarus abandoned any restrictive measures in the spring of 2020 amid the sharp spread of COVID-19. However, the problem was not that Lukashenka did not introduce strict quarantine, but that he ridiculed the very threat of coronavirus, claiming that the new disease needed to be treated with vodka, hockey, and tractors. The coronavirus was declared a "psychosis," and Lukashenka cynically commented on the first deaths of those infected - and even hinted that the pandemic was the result of a world conspiracy.

But despite the admonitions of Lukashenka and state propaganda, Belarusians took the threat of coronavirus quite seriously. According to the research company Satio, even without taking administrative measures, almost half of the inhabitants of Belarus (48%) changed their way of life, voluntarily switching to a regime of complete or partial self-isolation. About 70% of those surveyed in March advocated at least a complete ban on all public events, and more than half - for quarantine in schools and transferring all employees to "remote work." At the same time, an unprecedented wave of charitable initiatives arose in the country: business and simply not indifferent citizens donated money to provide doctors with everything they needed, hundreds of people signed up for volunteers.

Lukashenka unwittingly destroyed the paternalistic model of relations between the authorities and society by making fun of the coronavirus threat. This model was based on a simple principle: only the authorities are fighting against all threats and challenges. Moreover, the authorities could act absolutely ineffectively, but the most important thing is that society should not have got the impression that it was left one on one with the problem. But this is exactly what happened in the spring of 2020: the initiative in the fight against coronavirus passed into the hands of society.

For the first time in a long time, in the eyes of the people, an authoritarian regime looked weak and simply unnecessary.

The fact that Lukashenka's behavior had disastrous consequences for his rating was indirectly confirmed even by state propaganda. In early July, the head of the pro-government Union of Journalists Andrei Kryvashejeu published an allegedly secret document addressed to Lukashenka, prepared by the Operational Analytical Center (OAC). It said that Lukashenka's rating began to fall sharply in March and reached 60% in the country as a whole. The main reason for this phenomenon was the critical attitude of Belarusians to state measures to combat coronavirus.

The OAC figures did not inspire confidence in anyone, but there was no reason to doubt the tendency itself: even the state propaganda was forced to admit that the pandemic cost Lukashenka a quarter of his official rating. But in reality, the situation was even worse: according to data from the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences, leaked into the network, Lukashenka's trust rating was at the level of 24% in April. And the Internet polls of the largest Belarusian sites showed very low popularity of the head of state - only 3-5% were ready to vote for him in May.

Mistake number 2: the arrest of Tsikhanouski and Babaryka

From the very beginning, the election campaign demonstrated great demand for changes and a sharp increase in society's politicization. People stood in kilometer-long lines to the pickets of Siarhei Tsikhanouski and other campaign participants - the collection of signatures actually turned into a form of public protest; the media even wrote about the "signature revolution." In response, the authorities turned to repressions: on May 29, Siarhei Tsikhanouski was detained in Hrodna. On June 18, Viktar Babaryka was detained in Minsk. In addition, Viktar Babaryka and Valery Tsapkala were not registered as presidential candidates, and the spontaneous protests were brutally dispersed by the security forces.

The pre-election repression had three main consequences. First, they stimulated the mobilization of society - the authorities' insolent actions affected even those who were not previously interested in politics and were not at all worried when representatives of the old opposition fell under repression.

Second, the repression destroyed the conflict-free discourse in which Viktar Babaryka was building his election tactics - the most popular alternative candidate, having collected more than 400 thousand signatures. In fact, he argued that for changes in the country, it is not at all necessary to organize mass protests - it is enough just to come to the polling station and vote. "It is impossible to falsify the will of the people," he repeatedly stressed. By removing his most popular opponents from the election race, Lukashenka deprived society of such illusions. People gradually concluded that mass protest is still the only way to change the country.

Thirdly, Lukashenka unwittingly helped consolidate the protest electorate, since, after the refusal to register, the headquarters of Tsapkala and Babaryka united with the team of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. De facto, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya turned into a single opposition candidate and could now count on an electoral majority in the first round.

Lukashenka, having allowed registering Tsikhanouskaya, again miscalculated.

Mistake # 3: the terror of August 9-12

The next wave of mobilization and politicization of society was the result of unprecedented violence against protesters and the massive torture of detainees.

By betting on unlimited terror in suppressing post-election protests, Lukashenka probably wanted to repeat the 2010 scenario. Then, the demonstratively harsh dispersal of Ploscha and the criminal prosecution of its participants removed the question of the protests for years to come. Lukashenka planned to do the same now: to intimidate the society so that it would not think about protests for a long time. And since the electoral situation was now worse than in 2010, the violence should have been much larger. However, now the situation was different not only quantitatively but also qualitatively.

First, the paternalistic model of interaction between the authorities and society, within which the absolute majority of Belarusians had to remain apolitical, has already been destroyed. In the context of the widespread politicization of society, violence against protesters was no longer perceived as a fight between the opposition and the authorities - in the events of 2020, people saw terror against the entire people and not its individual representatives. Violence literally came to everyone's home: now Belarusians could watch the shooting and explosions right from their own windows.

Second, the problem of violence and torture went far beyond politics - it was primarily a matter of ethics and morality. It was the disagreement with the terrorist methods of the authorities that brought hundreds of thousands of people to the streets, provoked strikes in factories, and also led to a wave of layoffs in government agencies and law enforcement agencies.

Mistake # 4: Not making concessions

After the terror of August 9-12, Lukashenka no longer had good options for a way out of the situation. The protests took on an unprecedented scale, and the security forces were the only support of the current regime.

In fact, Lukashenka had only two options left. The first is to try to change the electoral situation, admit some of his mistakes, and calm the society down with certain concessions. The second is to make the final bet on total terror.

Under the first option, it was possible to initiate criminal cases for the murder and torture of protesters and bring certain security officials to justice, albeit as switchmen. In particular, it was possible to repeat the situation with the "Korzhych's case": then, recall, none of the officers fell under criminal prosecution for the death of a soldier, the minister did not lose his post, but three sergeants from Korzhych's unit were severely punished for hazing. Many were unhappy with this result (including Korzhych's relatives), but the process fulfilled its function - the topic of hazing was removed from the agenda. For all the difference in situations, the creation of a kind of legal prosecution of those guilty of murder and torture could calm at least some of the protesters. And this would already give a chance to overcome the alienation of power and society and build long-term relationships.

However, there was a risk here: in the conditions of an unstable socio-political situation, the security forces could rebel, believing that Lukashenka would capitulate and they would have to answer for everything alone. Lukashenka did not risk his relations with the security forces and made a bet on total legal segregation when the murder and torture of dissidents are not officially considered a crime, and any manifestation of protest can be prosecuted. The terror took on an unprecedented scale: more than 30 thousand were administratively detained, more than 900 people were prosecuted in connection with the protests (of which 169 have already been recognized as political prisoners), hundreds of people were tortured, at least 10 were killed.

Refusing any compromises with society, Lukashenka finally deprived his regime of the future.

Throne on bayonets

This year, there was a total politicization of the population in Belarus: the silent majority suddenly felt like citizens who were ready to risk themselves in order to achieve changes in the country. The unification and solidarization of Belarusians took place at all levels - down to individual neighborhoods and courtyards. These processes give grounds to speak about the birth of the Belarusian political nation. Lukashenka can only oppose them with terror, and this is the vulnerability of his regime.

Napoleon Bonaparte said that you can do anything with the help of bayonets, but you can't sit on them. This aphorism has repeatedly found its confirmation in history. Even the most brutal and bloody regimes tried to use a combination of methods to govern society: not only a stick but also a carrot. And if the dictators did not have a carrot, then the time of their reign was very short.

An exemplary example of such a combined policy was demonstrated by the leader of Bolshevik Russia, Vladimir Lenin, at the end of the Civil War. Then, brutally suppressed peasant uprisings raged throughout the territory of the former Russian Empire. But at the same time, Lenin embarked on the NEP policy, which improved the economic situation for the peasantry and other segments of the population. By the way, Lukashenka used a similar technique earlier: for example, in 2017, the harsh suppression of "protests of non-parasites" was combined with the abolition of the "decree on parasites" itself.

But now, Lukashenka cannot offer any carrot to the Belarusian society. He did not make concessions in matters of punishment for violence, and there are no resources to improve the situation in the economic sphere. Given the illegitimacy of the regime at the international level, there is simply nowhere to take resources. Instead, new taxes are expected to be introduced in 2021, which could only exacerbate the electoral situation for the regime. It is simply impossible to maintain power in such conditions for a long time.

Ihar Illiash, Belsat